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Abstract. One often finds in debate involving agents strongly committed
to their positions, that argument is promoted not through a rational
measured exchange of views but rather through stridency and clamour
as proponents try to shout down or otherwise suppress their opponents’
opinions. While the presence of moderators may go some way to allevi-
ating the effects of such approaches one has the problems of moderators
being ignored and the environment being of a nature that makes the ap-
pointment of such infeasible. In this article our concern is, in the first in-
stance, to examine the extent to which an environment where argument
is pursued through these means can be modelled. Within this model, we
briefly review what techniques may be adopted by participants looking
to present their own stance with minimal effort and maximal impact.
Keywords. abstract argumentation frameworks; directed graph spectrum;
Perron-Frobenius Theory;
Introduction
Consider a debating arena in which numerous different and conflicting opinions
are being championed by several protagonists. There are a number of tactics
sometimes adopted by participants that are not intended to progress their stance
through rational discourse, but rather since those using such means, mistakenly
and na¨ıvely believe them to make their point of view more compelling. Thus one
finds, for example in playground or nursery debate, techniques such as wearisome
repetition of the same point over and over, this sometimes reduced to single
word utterances. Repetition as an indicator of logically “weak” argument, has,
of course, long been recognized and studied as one class of fallacious reasoning:
e.g. the consequences of eo ipse moves in the dialogue protocol of Vreeswijk and
Prakken [16], the review of “stone-walling” and other non-cooperative tactics
from Gabbay and Woods [12,11]. More generally, strategies whose aim is not to
advance but rather to stifle or impede discussion underlie several studies, e.g.
Dunne [7,8], Sakama [15], Budzynska and Reed [4].
Participants contributing within (supposedly) more “mature” contexts – such
as political debates – will usually recognise the futility of constant repetition
as an argumentative tool. To compensate, however, (and often not consciously
aware that such measures are being used) they may have recourse to another
regressive (or at least non-progressive) technique: that of increasing the force
with which their points are delivered. Thus in non-structured debates this will
often take the form of increasing vocal volume in an attempt to drown out the
arguments of opponents, so rendering them inaudible to neutral observers. This,
in turn, may lead to those same opponents adopting identical tactics reiterating
their stance at louder and louder volumes. To counteract the deleterious effect
on reasoned debate that results from discussions sinking to the level of shambolic
shouting contests, in many legislative assemblies a neutral member is recognized
as having – among other responsibilities – some authority to intervene and impose
a semblance of order. For example, in the U.K. House of Commons, the roˆle of
Speaker fulfils this function.1 Nevertheless, despite the presence of a mediator to
oversee the conduct of discussions, it can happen (particularly on sensitive issues)
that their authority is ignored.2 Given that, even within structured settings with a
recognized moderator, there is the potential for debate to descend to acrimonious
discord, the likelihood of un-mediated exchanges degenerating to similar levels is
so much the greater.
Our aim in this paper is to consider such settings and a number of questions
arising therein. In particular the issue of what forms of model amenable to analytic
investigation can be used in order to treat,
a. Synthesis and discovery of strategies that are intended to impose a point
through volubility rather than reason.
b. Differences between moderated and un-moderated discussion, and the sus-
ceptibility of the latter to over-strident contributions skewing debate.
We find a basis for our approach by adapting the seminal abstract argumentation
frameworks (afs) of Dung [6]: in their pure form these encapsulate argument
interaction as a directed graph structure 〈X ,A〉 wherein X is a (assumed for
our purposes to be finite) set of atomic arguments and A ⊆ X × X describes
an attack relationship over these, so that 〈p, q〉 ∈ A captures the concept of the
arguments p and q being incompatible by reason of the argument p “attacking”
the argument q. For reasons we develop subsequently we augment A by assigning
to each 〈p, q〉 ∈ A a positive real value3 which we will refer to as the volubility
of 〈p, q〉 and denoted ν(〈p, q〉). A triple 〈p, q, r〉 will be referred to as a discord,
so that one has an implied relationship ∆ ⊆ X × X × R+ in which 〈p, q, r〉 ∈ ∆
should 〈p, q〉 ∈ A and ν(〈p, q〉) = r. Before developing our approach in depth it is
worth observing that the atomic (indivisible) view of “argument” taken in Dung’s
formalism, although sometimes the source of objections on account of its highly
abstract perspective, captures an important aspect relative to the topic of interest
in the present article. Specifically it is the forcefulness with which a claim, p is
1In the UK, the Speaker although having represented one of the major parties as a member
of parliament, on assuming this office, is non-partisan. This status being recognized by the fact
that in general elections it is a tradition that the (current) Speaker is unopposed when seeking
re-election as M.P. for their local constituency. There have been occasions, however, (the 2015
U.K. Parliamentary election being one) when this tradition has been ignored.
2Among (many) such examples in the UK, is the incident of the senior Conservative MP,
Michael Heseltine, seizing and waving the symbolic mace at Labour members singing the Red
Flag in the aftermath of a heated 1976 debate on state ownership (nationalization): the Speaker
was forced to suspend the sitting.
3We distinguish positive to indicate > 0 as opposed to non-negative, i.e. ≥ 0.
championed over another claim q – the attack 〈p, q〉 ∈ A – as assessed through
its volubility that is of interest, rather than any intrinsic merits (or otherwise)
of the arguments involved. We note that our model assigns weights to attacks
rather than to their source, i.e. the argument from which these originate. There
will, of course, be some (implied) relationship between the former (volubility)
and the latter (which will be referred to a stridency subsequently). The question
of how exactly to model the interaction between these two measures is of some
interest, however, while we consider some approaches, space does not permit a
full consideration of this issue. Our rationale for attack rather than argument
weighting is that this explictly recognises that a single argument might be exerted
with varying levels of force against different arguments, e.g. an “authority” figure
might feel confident enough in pushing a “weak” argument without shouting
against an argument of a subordinate while feeling the need to be more forceful
when the same argument is used to attack arguments of peers.
Our principal intention is to propose and establish some basic properties of
one approach. The formal setting raises a number of questions of interest, how-
ever, our discussion of these is largely to emphasize the potential for further de-
velopment rather than propose specific solutions. In the remainder of the paper,
we first reprise background from Dung’s model in Section 1 which gives a foun-
dation for the structures capturing “debate forms” in Section 2. Section 3 offers
the main technical development wherein the concept of a debate being “stable”
with respect to some underlying criteria is defined. Together with these criteria
we present a broad range of contexts through which a moderator may not only
determine whether a current state is “acceptable” but also choose or impose rules
enforcing stability. Conclusions are presented within Section 4.
1. Preliminaries
We begin by recalling the concept of abstract argumentation framework and ter-
minology from Dung [6]
Definition 1 We use X to denote a finite set of arguments with A ⊆ X × X the
so-called attack relationship over these. An argumentation framework (af) is a
pair H = 〈X ,A〉. A pair 〈x, y〉 ∈ A is referred to as ‘y is attacked by x’ or ‘x
attacks y’. Using S to denote an arbitrary subset of arguments for S ⊆ X ,
S− =def { p : ∃ q ∈ S such that 〈p, q〉 ∈ A}
S+ =def { p : ∃ q ∈ S such that 〈q, p〉 ∈ A}
In our subsequent treatment it is assumed for every argument x ∈ X that 〈x, x〉 /∈
A: our intention being to consider the effect of x on others, i.e. attacks 〈x, y〉
stemming from x. Participants are considered not to fight against themselves.
Starting from two concepts – those of conflict-free sets S and the arguments
acceptable to such, Dung offers a number of proposals in order precisely to cap-
ture the informal notion of “collection of justifiable arguments”. Thus, x ∈ X is
acceptable with respect to S if for every y ∈ X that attacks x there is some z ∈ S
that attacks y. Given S ⊆ X , F(S) ⊆ X is the set of all arguments that are
acceptable with respect to S, i.e.
F(S) = {x ∈ X : ∀ y such that 〈y, x〉 ∈ A , ∃ z ∈ S s.t. 〈z, y〉 ∈ A}
A subset, S, is conflict-free if no argument in S is attacked by any other argument
in S, with ⊆-maximal conflict-free sets referred to as naive extensions. A conflict-
free set S is admissible if every y ∈ S is acceptable w.r.t S. S is a complete
extension if S is conflict-free and should x ∈ F(S) then x ∈ S, i.e. every argument
that is acceptable to S is a member of S, so that F(S) = S. The set of ⊆-maximal
complete extensions coincide with the set of ⊆-maximal admissible sets, these
being termed preferred extensions. The set S is a stable extension if S is conflict
free and S+ = X \ S.
For a given semantics σ and af, H(X ,A) we use Eσ(H) to denote the set of
all subsets of X that satisfy the conditions specified by σ.
2. Debate Arenas & Debate Evolution
It was mentioned earlier that an additional component is added to the basic
abstract formalism described by afs.
Definition 2 A debate arena, D, is formed by a triple 〈X ,A, ν〉 where 〈X ,A〉 is
an af and ν : A → R+ is the debate volubility function, associating with each
〈x, y〉 ∈ A a positive real value.
The debate volubility function is viewed as describing the force with which its
promoter, pi(〈x, y〉), asserts the argument to its antagonist, α(〈x, y〉).
Of course the idea of augmenting Dung’s ur–formalism by allowing quanti-
tative associations with attacks (and, indeed, arguments themselves) has a rich
history, being adopted in, amongst others: treatments of so-called “inconsistency
tolerance” in Dunne et. al [9], Coste-Marquis et al. [5]; algorithmic treatments,
e.g. Bistarelli and Santini [3]; modelling probabilistic structures, e.g. Li et al. [13].
The scenarios of interest to our study involve, however, an aspect which the
quantitive formulation of debate arena fails to describe: its treatment of volubility
is static. In practice, given the context modelled, one would expect the level at
which a promoter directs the attack on an antagonist to vary. Such variation
need not necessarily be a monotonic increase in ν(〈x, y〉): hence the often used
rhetorical device of reducing the level at which a point is made for emphasis.4
Our notion of debate arena can, in essence, be seen as a snapshot within an
evolving debate: contributors adjusting their promotion of given arguments over
time. In order to reflect dynamic elements we formalise this concept via,
4For example notice: the contrasting questioning styles in Maximilian Schell’s cross-
examination of Montgomery Clift and the underspoken manner in which its final observation is
delivered (Judgement at Nuremberg, Kramer, 1961); the unvarying level of Olivier’s repetition
of the question “Is it safe?” with finality indicated by only a slight drop in tone. (Marathon
Man, Schlesinger, 1976).
Definition 3 An evolving debate is a sequence,
D = 〈D0, D1, . . . , Dk, . . . , 〉
of debate arenas in which Dk = 〈X ,Ak, νk〉 with νk : A0 → R+ ∪ {0}. This is
required to satisfy
∀ k ≥ 1 Ak ⊆ Ak−1 ; νk : Ak → R+
Furthermore, should 〈x, y〉 ∈ Ak−1 but 〈x, y〉 /∈ Ak then νk(〈x, y〉) = 0.
Notice that an evolving debate may, in principle, be an infinite sequence of debate
arenas. We can, however, prescribe conditions under which D may be treated as
finite. One of these follows directly from the subset condition Ak ⊆ Ak−1, namely:
an evolving debate is terminal if at some point, t ≥ 0, we have At = ∅. This
condition is, in fact, an extreme form (and thence implied by), the notion of an
evolving debate reaching stasis.5 Hence an evolving debate has reached stasis if
it contains debate arenas Dk and Dr with r > k and νk = νr (note that this
implies Ak = Ar). In general we may be interested in the specific case r = k+ 1,
but in principle given that there is no requirement for monotonicity respecting
νk and νr one could reach the situation where identical arenas appear after some
interval. Implicitly, by regarding the occurrence of this as indicative of stasis the
implication is that should νk = νr then νk+1 = νr+1. Notice this is an assumption
concerning how D would evolve rather than a formal claim of its structure.
3. Stable debates: detection and enforcement
We recall that one issue of interest concerns responding to situations where the
force with which arguments are promoted, reaches a level sufficient to obstruct
other participants. In fact this scenario has similarities to the well-studied prob-
lems of dealing with power control in mobile communications, see e.g. Bertoni [2].6
A significant distinction from our setting and such as these is the fact that the
latter occurs within a rather more “cooperative” context: levels of signal strength
being assigned externally having been determined at optimal levels through anal-
ysis and, once fixed, no deviation occurs.
To these ends the following factors are relevant: the force with which argument
xj is being pressed upon the promoter of argument xi; the stridency with which
the champion of argument xi is proclaiming this to others.
The first of these, which we will denote by Fij is,
Fij =
{
0 if 〈j, i〉 /∈ A
ν(〈j, i〉) otherwise
5We, intentionally, avoid the, potentially misleading, term “agreement” (which might reflect
a specific form of “stasis”) and rather overloaded words such as “equilibrium”.
6For example, when there are several competing “mobile phone networks” each using trans-
mitter stations whose signal strength must be high enough to enable good reception by the
network users but not at such a level as to cause excessive interference with other networks.
The latter, denoted Si is described by a positive real value.
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For each xi the quantity Si represents the overall volume that is being used
to press its merits upon others. Conversely, Fij captures the interference with this
case being inflicted by the promoter of xj . One might reasonably claim, therefore,
that xi is being “promoted too forcefully” should its stridency Si “significantly”
exceed the total interference that it must tolerate as inflicted by the other actors
in the system. This interpretation raises the following questions: how to assess
whether the agent championing xi is “too strident”, informally, how is it deter-
mined if this agent is shouting too loudly? Secondly, what level of promotion is
considered “excessive”?
For the moment let us assume that each argument has assigned to it a non-
negative real value, µi, that defines (in some sense) the “acceptable” level of force
with which xi can be promoted without this being considered detrimental to the
interests of others. Then should the ratio between Si and the amount of interfer-
ence dealt with, violate the levels set by µi then one can conclude that the actor
promoting xi is “shouting too much”. We have, however, one point of detail to
consider, namely how to describe what is measured as “the amount of interfer-
ence dealt with”. In principle one could simply fix this as the total of the forces
(Fij) directed against it. The problem with this, however, is its failure to take
into account how an agent promoting xj (with 〈xj , xi〉 ∈ A) might manipulate
the system. Suppose, in a moderated system, the sanction for “shouting too loud”
is (perhaps temporary) expulsion. Then measuring “acceptable” noise level via
(Si/
∑
j 6=i Fij) ≤ µi allows the agent pushing xj to (for the time being) fix ν(〈j, i〉)
at a “token minimum” whilst compensating, for instance, by increasing the level
with which xj is forced upon other agents. Such manouevres lead to an increase in
(Si/
∑
j 6=i Fij) (even more so if conducted in conjunction with other allied agents)
with the possible result that the agent promoting xi is suspended even though
there has been no increase in stridency from this agent. Despite this, the agent
pressing xj benefits (xi is taken out of the system) even though it may be push-
ing some arguments “harder” (in order to maintain its – presumably considered
acceptable – level of stridency). To moderate such manipulative effects (although
as we discuss later, it is uncertain whether these can be entirely eliminated), in
gauging whether an agent is “shouting too loudly” we view the interference from
xj it must contend with relative to the overall volume with which xj is being
announced. That is to say, the relevant ratio we examine in deciding if xi is being
pushed “too hard” is not Si/(
∑
j 6=i Fij) but rather
Si∑
j 6=i FijSj
This now leads to
Definition 4 Let µ = 〈µ1, µ2, . . . , µn〉 and D = 〈X ,A, ν〉 be a debate arena. We
say that D is stable with respect to stridency µ (or simply µ–stable) if
7We defer, for the moment, issues arising in relating Si to the volubility in promoting xi.
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n Si∑
j 6=i FijSj
≤ µi
In other words the debate represented by D = 〈X ,A, ν〉 is being “harmoniously”
conducted should the maximum level of noise (µi) set for each participant not be
exceeded by any.
If we examine the condition described in Defn. 4 then (for the limits defined
by µ) the debate arena is µ-stable if
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n Si ≤ µi
∑
i 6=j
FijSj
Now consider the n× n force, F and constraint, C, matrices defined through
Fij =
{
0 if i = j
Fij otherwise
Cij =
{
µi if i = j
0 otherwise
together with the n×1 column vector, S formed by the transpose of 〈S1, S2, . . . , Sn〉.
The n required relations are then expressed as:
C× F× S ≥ S
or, writing B for the product of C× F:
B× S ≥ S (1)
Now, in the scenario we have presented, at any given instant (for D within an
evolving debate D): F is determined by the current volubility function; C has
been fixed (possibly through a moderator); and we have assumed S is within the
control of the agents involved.
Thus within a given D the component B = C × F of (1) is unchanging and
provided that the contribution from S satisfies B×S ≥ S the debate is µ–stable.
This summary reduces the issue being considered to the following question
Are there conditions for B that (if satisfied) allow some “suitable” S to be
adopted?
This question is simply a rephrasing of a classical linear algebra question, as
captured by
Fact 1 8 For an n × n real-valued matrix, A and λ ∈ R+, the n × 1 (non-zero)
vector z satisfies Az = λz if and only if λ is an eigenvalue of A and z an
associated (right) eigenvector.
Of course, should any z satisfy Az = λz, (with λ ≥ 1) then we find infinitely
many such solutions simply by using any scalar multiple of z.
Now it is easily seen that B is non-negative. If it is also irreducible9 we have,
8What is stated as “fact” here, is often used as a formal definition of eigenvalue and eigenvector
w.r.t. to a matrix A.
9An n× n non-negative real-valued matrix A is said to be irreducible if for each 〈i, j〉 there
is some k ∈ N for which [Ak]ij > 0.
Theorem 1 (Perron-Frobenius Theorem [14,10])
If A is an irreducible n× n matrix then,
PF1. There is a positive real eigenvalue, λApf , of A with positive eigenvectors.
PF2. If λ is any other10 eigenvalue of A then |λ| < λApf . Notice that, writing
λ = x + iy with y 6= 0 in the case of complex values, |λ| is the (positive)
square root of (x2 + y2).
In total Thm. 1, prescribes sufficient conditions for D to be µ-stable.
Theorem 2 The debate arena D = 〈X ,A, ν〉 is µ-stable if the product of constraint
and force matrices C× F is irreducible and λC×Fpf ≥ 1.
Proof: Immediate from definitions and consequences of Thm. 1. The stridency
vector S can be chosen as any (positive) eigenvector for λC×Fpf . These properties
and choices ensure
(C× F)× S = λC×Fpf × S ≥ S
2
The requirement in Thm. 2 that the supporting matrix C×F be irreducible may
seem unduly limiting: in fact this is not the case.
Theorem 3 If the structure 〈X ,A〉 describes a strongly-connected11 directed graph
then,
∀ ν : A → R+, µ ∈ 〈R+〉|X | C× F is irreducible.
Proof: (Outline) Let B denote C× F. Then,
[B]ij =
n∑
k=1
CikFkj = µiFij
Thus it suffices to establish that 〈X ,A〉 being strongly-connected implies F is
irreducible. Consider any 〈xi, xj〉 ∈ X 2. If 〈xi, xj〉 ∈ A then Fij > 0 so that the
choice k = 1 witnesses [Fk]ij > 0. If 〈xi, xj〉 /∈ A (so that Fij = 0) let t be the
number of arguments in any path from xi to xj (where t > 2)
12 that is
xi ≡ y1 → y2 → · · · → yt ≡ xj
10In general, the spectrum {λ1, . . . , λm} of eigenvalues for A could contain n elements, some
of which may be complex.
11A directed graph 〈V,E〉 is said to be strongly-connected if for every pair 〈vi, vj〉 ∈ V 2 there
is a directed path of edges in E by which vj can be reached from vi.
12Note these do not have to be distinct, so a path from x1 to x1 might be witnessed by
x1 ≡ y1 → y2 → y3 ≡ x1 in the event of A containing symmetric attacks 〈x1, y2〉 and 〈y2, x1〉.
so that 〈yk, yk+1〉 ∈ A for all 1 ≤ k < t. We show by induction on t ≥ 2 that
when such a path exists from xi to xj then [F
t−1]ij > 0. The base (t = 2) is
already established via xi ≡ y1 → y2 ≡ xj , i.e. the case 〈xi, xj〉 ∈ A. Assuming
the property holds for all t < k with k ≥ 3, i.e. [Fk−1]ij > 0, suppose
xi ≡ y1 → y2 → · · · → yk ≡ xj
is a path linking xi to xj and that no path with at least one attack and at most
k − 1 between the two exists. By definition,
[Fk−1]ij = [Fk−2 × F]ij =
n∑
r=1
[Fk−2]irFrj
and (with a slight notational abuse)
n∑
r=1
[Fk−2]irFrj ≥ [Fk−2]i(t−1)F(t−1)j
Now F(t−1)j > 0 since 〈yt−1, xj〉 ∈ A and (via the Inductive Hypothesis)
[Fk−2]i(t−1) > 0 (since xi ≡ y1 → · · · → yk−1 is a path from xi to yk−1). Hence
we deduce [Fk−1]ij > 0 and F is irreducible. 2
In combination, Thms. 2 and 3 indicate that for any strongly-connected af, a
moderator is able to carry out some very basic determination of a corresponding
debate arena’s stability regardless of ν : A → R+ and the moderator’s desired
constraint settings, µ.
Thus, given the starting point, D0, in (what will proceed as) an evolving
debate D an initial analysis could proceed by:
a. The moderator decides what they consider to be the maximal acceptable
levels of noise, i.e fixes µ ∈ 〈R+〉n in such a way that for all τ ∈ 〈R+〉n,
should τi > µi (irrespective of other components), then τ is considered to
be unreasonable.
b. Using Cµ and F0 (the constraint and force matrices resulting from µ and
D0) compute λ0,µpf the (unique) maximal positive eigenvalue for Cµ × F0.
c. If λ
0,µ
pf ≥ 1, set 〈S1, S2, . . . , Sn〉 – the permitted stridency levels – as(∑
〈xi,xj〉∈A0 ν0(〈xi, xj〉)∑n
i=1 wi
)
〈w1, w2, . . . , wn〉
where w is a (transposed) eigenvector of λ
0,µ
pf . The multiplicative term pre-
ceding this is just a normalizing factor. This gives wi > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
d. Notify agents of the limits on total volubility.
The steps outlined in (a)–(d), raise several further issues. Amongst the most
pressing of these we have the following questions.
Q1 Our derivation did not assume any relations between values of Si and the
volubility used when xi is promoted. This, however, would not typically be
the case, i.e. one would expect to see some relationship between Si and
{ ν(〈xi, xj〉) : 〈xi, xj〉 ∈ A}
Q2 What steps could be taken if, for the choices colouring the computation in
(b), the outcome is λ
0,µ
pf < 1. In other words D0 is “inherently unstable”
with respect to µ?
Q3 What effects on overall coordination of debate would arise, should some
subset S ⊂ X act collectively to exploit some common grounds, e.g. S ∈
Eσ(〈X ,A〉) for some semantics σ?
We consider the first of these in a little more detail here.
Suppose, instead of being an arbitrary positive real, the stridency Si is directly
related to {ν(〈xi, xj〉 : 〈xi, xj〉 ∈ A}, via
Si =def
∑
〈xi,xj〉∈A
ν(〈xi, xj〉)
That is, the total volume emanating in defending xi is the sum of the efforts put
into the individual attacks with xi as their source. It is easily seen that,
Si =
∑
〈xi,xj〉∈A
ν(〈xi, xj〉) =
∑
j 6=i
Fji
Recalling that Fpq = 0 when 〈xq, xp〉 /∈ A) the relevant ratio is now,∑
Fji∑
(Fij
∑
Fkj)
How does this affect the matrix representation of the system of inequalities con-
sidered earlier? Letting 1 denote the n×1 column vector, each of whose elements
is 1, it is easy to see that
S = FT × 1
(AT denoting the transpose of A, i.e. the n×n matrix for which [AT]ij = [A]ji).
This now indicates the conditions on C and F must satisfy,
C× F× FT × 1 ≥ FT × 1
In other words sufficient conditions for the debate arena, D, to be µ-stable is that
FT× 1 is an eigenvector for λC×Fpf with this eigenvalue being at least 1. In which
event,
C× F× FT × 1 = λC×Fpf × FT × 1
≥ FT × 1
Regarding our second issue – possible actions in the event that the combina-
tion of constraint and force matrices do not allow a suitable stridency assignment
to be made – one can posit two approaches: firstly to weaken the desired condi-
tions and adjust C upwards according to some convention; secondly to consider
approaches whereby some subset of existing arguments are “suspended” in the
hope that the reduced set-up will allow some degree of harmony. Of course, in
both of these approaches a large number of further questions arise. In the first
solution approach:
a. what are good bases for adjusting C?
b. If agents (or a subset of these) view such increased tolerance of noise as an
indicator of “weakness” on the part of a moderator, what is to prevent such
increasing their contribution to S so that even more generous commitments
within C have no effect?
Similarly the second solution raises,
c. The “obvious” candidates to remove are those corresponding to agents for
which Si > µi. We observed earlier, in choosing
∑
j 6=i FijSj to measure
the degree of interference that xi is subjected to, that naive mechanisms
might allow agents to manipulate the system, (for example if we defined
“interference” by
∑
j 6=i Fij). From the moderator’s perspective such manip-
ulation ought to be ignored. Nevertheless there are many possibilities for
choosing the subset of agents to suspend ranging from “the agent for which
(
∑
j 6=i Fji − µi) is largest”, to all agents exceeding µi.
d. A rather more subtle problem with “brute-force” suspension can, however,
appear. Removal of xi from 〈X ,A, ν〉 will induce a sub-graph of 〈X ,A〉.
Our discussion of C × F and its properties, was predicated on this be-
ing irreducible: property gauranteed in the event of 〈X ,A〉 being strongly-
connected. Strong-connectivity of 〈X ,A〉 does not, however, ensure strong-
connectivity of the framework induced by X \{xi}. In principle this may cre-
ate complications with dominant (i.e. maximal) eigenvalues and existence
of positive associated eigenvectors.
As a final issue we, briefly, consider the assumption of “strong-connectivity”.
While this is useful in guaranteeing the conditions of Thm. 1 are met, it is not an
essential prerequisite of our approach. In particular, by considering the strongly-
connected component decomposition of 〈X ,A〉 – whose benefits have been studied
in Baroni et al. [1] – similar analyses of acceptable levels of volubility are possible.
4. Conclusions
The main intention of this paper has been to offer a model (based on Dung’s
classical af formalism) by which problems arising from over-heated debates can
be studied. Such models may offer a vehicle for considering divers strategies that
could be adopted by moderators in controlling debates with minimal intervention
being required. Underpinning the problems of interest is the concern that the force
with which an argument is made can seem (to observers) at least as significant
factor in gauging its merits as the argument’s intrinsic logic and rationale. Our
principal aim in this paper has been to highlight an important “non-logical” facet
of real-world debate and argument together with a possible modelling approach.
It is, of course, the case that this is rather crude and raises a number of directions
for future research: a number of these are the focus of work currently in progress.
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